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Abstract— A mobile ad hoc network (MANET) is a 
collection of autonomous nodes that communicate with each 
other by forming a multi-hop radio network and 
maintaining connections in a decentralized manner. Security 
remains a major challenge for these networks due to their 
features of open medium, dynamically changing topologies, 
reliance on cooperative algorithms, absence of centralized 
monitoring points, and lack of clear lines of defense. Most of 
the routing protocols for MANETs are thus vulnerable to 
various types of attacks.  For security, these protocols are 
highly dependent on cryptographic key exchange operations. 
This paper presents a multi-path certification protocol for 
efficient and reliable key exchange among the nodes in a 
MANET. Simulation results have shown the effectiveness 
and efficiency of the protocol.  
 
Index Terms— mobile ad hoc networks, multi-path 
routing, security, certificates, DSR protocol.   
I. INTRODUCTION 
MANET is a collection of wireless hosts that can be 
rapidly deployed as a multi-hop packet radio 
network without the aid of any established infrastructure 
or centralized administrator. Such networks can be used 
to enable next generation battlefield applications, 
including situation awareness systems for maneuvering 
war fighters, and remotely deployed unmanned micro-
sensor networks. MANETs have some special 
characteristic features such as unreliable wireless media 
(links) used for communication between hosts, constantly 
changing network topologies and memberships, limited 
bandwidth, battery, lifetime, and computation power of 
nodes etc. While these characteristics are essential for the 
flexibility of MANETs, they introduce specific security 
concerns that are absent or less severe in wired networks. 
MANETs are vulnerable to various types of attacks. 
These include passive eavesdropping, active interfering, 
impersonation, and denial-of-service. Intrusion 
prevention measures such as strong authentication and 
redundant transmission can be used to improve the 
security of an ad hoc network. However, these techniques 
can address only a subset of the threats. Moreover, they 
are costly to implement. The dynamic nature of ad hoc 
networks requires that prevention techniques should be 
complemented by detection techniques, which monitor 
 
 
security status of the network and identify malicious 
behavior. 
One of the most critical problems in MANETs is the 
security vulnerabilities of routing protocols. A set of 
nodes in a MANET may be compromised in such a way 
that it may not be possible to detect their malicious 
behavior easily. Such nodes can generate new routing 
messages to advertise non-existent links, provide 
incorrect link state information, and flood other nodes 
with routing traffic, thus inflicting Byzantine failure in the 
network. Several secure routing protocols have been 
proposed for MANETs based on cryptographic 
mechanisms [1]. Almost all of them assume the existence 
of a secure channel through which a security association 
has been established between the source and the 
destination. However, the prerequisite for such a secure 
channel to exist is the existence of a security association. 
This creates a routing security interdependency cycle [2].  
In this paper, an efficient key exchange protocol is 
proposed for MANETs that can be easily integrated with 
a routing protocol thereby providing an integrated 
framework of routing and security and solving the routing 
security interdependency cycle. The rest of this paper is 
organized as follows. Section II presents some related 
work in MANET security. Section III describes the 
proposed protocol. Section IV provides performance 
evaluations of the protocol through simulations. Finally 
Section V provides concludes the paper. 
II. RELATED WORK 
The problem of security and cooperation enhancement 
among the nodes in a MANET has received considerable 
attention by the researchers. Cryptography remains the 
most widely proposed solution to provide authentication 
nodes. However, cryptography assumes safe key-
exchange, which is particularly difficult to realize in 
multi-hop communications where attackers may launch 
man-in-the-middle attacks.  
 Zhou and Haas have introduced a threshold 
cryptography-based key management scheme for 
MANETs [3]. A group of n servers together with a master 
public/private key pair are first deployed by a Certificate 
Authority (CA). The shares of master private key are 
generated using threshold   cryptography.   Thus only   n  
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 servers together can form the whole signature. If any node 
wants to join the networks, it must collect all of the n 
partial signatures. This scheme has been extended in a 
mechanism proposed by Kong et al [4], where a 
centralized dealer is introduced to issue certificates and 
private key shares to t nodes during the network 
bootstrapping phase. A threshold cryptography system is 
deployed in order to provide a (t, n) secret sharing 
service. With statistically unique and cryptographically 
verifiable (SUCV) identifiers [5], nodes compute their 
addresses applying a non-reversible hash function on their 
public key. Any node can then directly bind a public key 
(PK) to its owner address and an IP can not be spoofed 
without the associate private key. Capkun et al. [6] 
proposed a protocol for MANETs by adapting pretty 
good privacy (PGP). In this proposition, a node issues 
certificates for other nodes. The nodes then exchange 
certificates and build certification graphs. When two 
nodes want to exchange their PK, they merge their graphs 
and establish a certificate chaining in the resulting graph. 
Eshenaur et al have proposed a trust establishment 
mechanism in which a node in a MANET can generate 
trust evidence about any other node. Abdul-Rahman and 
Hailes have proposed a distributed trust model that uses a 
recommendation protocol to exchange trust-related 
information [7]. The model is suited for establishing trust 
relationships that are less formal and temporary in nature, 
e.g., some ad hoc commercial transactions. 
III. PROPOSED KEY EXCHANGE PROTOCOL 
The proposed protocol integrates a key exchange 
protocol with routing in a MANET and thus solves the 
routing-security interdependency cycle [2]. The objective 
of a routing protocol is to establish a path between a 
source node and a destination node. To achieve this 
objective, the reactive routing protocols for MANETs 
broadcast a route request message in the network so that 
the route to the destination may be discovered. The 
proposed key exchange protocol utilizes this approach to 
retrieve the public keys (PKs) of the nodes. To find a 
certificate of a PK, the source node floods the network 
with a certificate request that is replied either by the 
target node or by an intermediate node that has a valid 
certificate of the PK of the target node. The proposed 
protocol is secure against malicious attackers that may try 
to distribute spurious certificates in the network and cause 
routing disruption. To make the protocol robust and 
reliable, two approaches are taken: (i) multi-path 
certificate exchange and (ii) trust-based certification. The 
details of the algorithm are described below.   
A. Description 
In the proposed protocol, it is assumed that every node 
in a MANET first generates a public/private key pair.  
Since this key pair is generated by the node itself, the 
node needs to authenticate with some members in the 
network before it can join and access network resources. 
This authentication is based on a certificate exchange. 
The authentication is mutual. Thus, if a node S receives 
the public key (PK) of a node D, S issues a certificate for 
D’s PK. In turn, D also issues a certificate for S’s PK. In 
the rest of the paper, the set of nodes that has certified for 
node S’s PK is denoted as K(S). As the authentication is 
mutual, every node in K(S) has its PK certified by S. 
Although the approach of multi-path has not been 
widely used in certificate exchange schemes for 
MANETs, it can greatly improve the reliability of a 
certificate exchange protocol. In designing the proposed 
protocol two types of multi-path message exchanges are 
distinguished: (i) multi-path certificate exchange and (ii) 
multi-path routing. In multi-path certificate exchange, the 
public key of a node is certified by different nodes 
(Figure 1 (a)). Due to multiple independent certifications, 
the confidence assigned to these certificates is higher. A 
formal computation of the trust values for the certificates 
may be done using Dempster-Shafer theory [6]. Figure 1 
(b) shows an example of a multi-path routing, where a 
node sends a certificate for another node through multiple 
node-disjoint paths. Since paths do not have any common 
node, a malicious node can at most prevent a certificate 
exchange but cannot spoof the identity of another node 
during the certificate exchange process. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Certificate level multi-path and routing level multi-path 
The proposed protocol also utilizes a trust management 
mechanism [8] to keep track of certification operations. 
The trust value of a certificate issuing node increases as 
more number of nodes confirm the public key for which 
the certificate is issued. On the other hand, when it is 
detected that a node has issued a spurious certificate, the 
trust assigned to the node will be decreased and all 
subsequent certificates issued by the node will also have 
less confidence associated with them. Consequently, if 
there is a conflict between certificates, the PK certified by 
the more trustworthy node(s) will be accepted as genuine.  
B. Operations 
1. Initialization: In the proposed protocol, before a node 
enters the network, it generates a public/private key pair. 
As a node joining for the first time attempts to get several 
certificates for of its PK from the existing nodes, it floods 
the network with a certificate request (CREQ) message. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. The use of intermediate nodes for certification 
 2. Certificate exchange: Before requesting a node D’s 
certificate, a node S evaluates the minimum trust value 
that is required to consider the public key of D as reliable. 
This threshold value of trust is called the minimum public 
key trust value (MPKTV). This evaluation is local and 
based on S’s security requirements. Node S then 
broadcasts a CREQ for D’s certificates including D’s 
address, the list of nodes K(S). The CREQ is sent with a 
small time to live (TTL) to reduce communication 
overhead of the protocol.  Every intermediate node I that 
receives the CREQ checks the PK of D and looks in its 
own certificate list.  
If I has no certificate for D or if it already replied to the 
CREQ, it simply forwards the packet. Otherwise I sends a 
certificate reply (CREP) to S containing a certificate of 
D’s public key signed by I (Figure 2(a)). If I does not 
know S, it constructs a self-signed certificate and informs 
S that it wants to make a certificate exchange (Figure 
2(b)). This packet is sent through multiple node-disjoint 
paths to S. If I has a route to D in its cache, it informs D 
that S has requested its PK. D responds and requests a 
certificate for S’s PK. Since I and D can authenticate each 
other, the communication between D and I can be made 
secure by using I's signature. Therefore, no node can 
corrupt the certificate of S issued by I. If D does not know 
sufficient number of nodes, it replies to the CREQ itself. 
S repeats the operation with an increased TTL until it 
receives the required minimum number of certificates for 
D’s PK. After receiving the certificates, S sends the first 
packet to D which includes the list of nodes which has 
provided the certificates for D’s PK.  In this way, D gets 
the information about the known certifiers of S. Once 
they have exchanged their PKs, S and D issue certificates 
for each other. This certificate exchange protocol can 
now be directly applied in routing as S and D do not have 
to execute any expensive route discovery procedure for 
routing.  
3. Certificate revocation: As authentication is mutual, 
nodes maintain a list of certifiers. An implicit revocation 
scheme [6] is adopted, where each node periodically 
updates its public key by communicating secured 
certificate exchange messages with its peers. 
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
A. Simulation parameters 
An extensive simulation has been carried out on the 
proposed scheme to evaluate its performance in several 
network conditions. The proposed scheme is implemented 
on network simulator ns-2. The simulation was carried 
out on an abstracted ad network consisting of 100 mobile 
nodes over an area of 1500 m x 1500 m. The duration of 
simulation was 120 s. Random way point model has been 
chosen for node mobility pattern with maximum speed of 
a node as 10 m/s and average host pause time of 30 s.  
During each simulation, 5 communications are 
established that require certificate exchanges among the 
nodes. The dynamic source routing (DSR) protocol is 
used for routing [9]. For each configuration, 10 
simulations are run and the average value is taken as the 
result. The following three metrics are studied:  
(1) Valid PK acceptance rate: it is the ratio of the 
number of valid public keys accepted and the total 
number of public keys requested for. 
(2) Corrupted PK acceptance rate: it is the ratio of the 
number of corrupted public keys accepted and the total 
number of public keys requested for. 
(3) Delay: it is the time interval between the request of 
a PK and the acceptance of it. 
In the simulation, attacks are simulated where the 
attacker nodes send spurious certificates to the nodes 
which have requested for those certificates. These attacks 
can be isolated attacks where every attacker certifies a 
different PK. However, the attackers may also launch a 
cooperative attack where different attackers collude and 
send certifies the same (spurious) PK. Both these types of 
attacks are simulated. The number of attacker is varied 
from 0% to 40% of the total number of nodes. Node 
initialization is not simulated. It is assumed that each 
node has successfully executed the initialization step by 
exchanging requisite number of certificates with the 
honest nodes in the networks. The number of certificate 
exchange during the initialization is varied from 0 to 20 
for each source and destination. A trust value of 0.75 is 
assigned to a node that is authenticated during the 
initialization step, while other nodes are assumed to have 
a trust value of 0.5. MPKTV is varied from 0.5 to 0.9.  
 
Figure 3. Public key acceptance rate for varying number of attackers 
The number of certificate exchanges processed during 
the initialization goes from 0 to 20 for each source and 
destination. We assume that a 0.75 trust value is assigned 
to node authenticated during the initialization step, while 
0.5 is assigned to other nodes. The MPKTV varies form 
0.5 to 0.9. 
B. Analysis 
1. Isolated attackers: Figure 3 depicts the variation of 
the valid PK acceptance rate and the corrupted PK 
acceptance rate with varying number of attackers. The 
MPKTV is kept constant at 0.5 while the number of 
attackers is varied from 0 to 40. There was no initial trust 
between any pair of nodes in the networks. It is observed 
that the rate of valid PK acceptance falls rapidly as the 
number of attackers increases. The trend is just the 
reverse for the rate of corrupted PK acceptance.  Since 
there was no initial trust at the initial stage, no 
intermediate node could issue a certificate for a 
requesting node. Only the destination node could reply to 
a CREQ message. When there are more attacker nodes in 
the network, there is a higher probability that an attacker 
sends a reply to a CREQ message. Since MPKTV is 
taken 0.5, every PK is considered as valid and accepted 
by the requester. For any higher value of MPKTV, no PK 
 will be accepted since no node has enough level of trust 
for issuing an acceptable certificate.  
 
Figure 4. The acceptance rate of valid PK with varying no. of attackers 
Figure 4 shows the valid PK acceptance rate with 
initially 20 known nodes in the network for different 
values of MPKTV. It is observed that except when 
MPKTV = 0.5, the acceptance rate is as high as 90%.  It 
has also been observed that the acceptance rate of valid 
PK increases by 10% when the number of initially known 
nodes is increased form 5 to 10 and then from 10 to 20 
(the figures for the cases of initially known nodes 5 and 
10 are not produced to space constraint). With more 
number of nodes initially known, more nodes send replies 
to a CREQ message, the average trust in a CREP message 
increases and thus more PKs are accepted. When 
MPKTV value is 0.5, any reply is accepted, and the 
probability to receive a valid PK increases. As the 
number of attackers increases and becomes more than the 
number of nodes initially known, the probability of 
accepting corrupted PKs increases. 
 
Figure 5. Delay is certification for varying number of known nodes 
Figure 5 shows the delay associated in receiving the 
reply to a CREQ in absence of any attacker node in the 
network. As the number of known nodes increases, the 
time required to receive a sufficient number of replies 
decreases to satisfy a given MPKTV. Moreover, the delay 
increases with MPKTV because of the increasing 
requirement for acceptance of a PK. However, a node that 
has many certifiers of its PK will be quickly authenticated 
even when the MPKTV is high. This is validated in 
Figure 5 as delay is found to decrease with increase in 
number of nodes known initially in the network. 
 
Figure 6. Performance in MANET attacked by a group of colluding 
nodes (MPKTV= 0.7 in  (a) and 0.9 in (b)) 
2. Colluding attackers: Finally, the proposed protocol is 
simulated in a scenario with colluding attacker nodes.  In 
Figure 6 (a) and Figure 6 (b), valid-x and corrupted-x 
denote the rate of acceptance of valid and corrupted 
certificates respectively when x nodes are known initially 
in the network. It may be observed that some corrupted 
PKs are accepted since a sufficient number of colluding 
attackers issue certificates for these corrupted PKs. With 
MPKTV = 0.9 the rate of acceptance of corrupted PKs is 
less but as expected, it increases with the number of 
attackers. Similarly, the rate of acceptance of valid 
certificates increases with the increase in the known 
nodes in the network. Nevertheless the increases are 
much more important when the number of known nodes 
goes from 5 to 10 that for other increases. An interesting 
point to note is that with 20 nodes known to the source 
and the destination, the acceptance rate of corrupted 
certificates decreases even when the number of attackers 
increases from 30 to 40. This is because of the fact that 
when the network contains many attackers, source and 
destination are more likely to have known nodes in 
common. Since the common nodes are safe certifiers, 
with more common nodes in the network, higher is the 
probability of safe certificate exchange.  
V. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, a key exchange protocol for MANETs is 
proposed that can be integrated with a routing protocol. 
The protocol is light-weight, efficient and alleviates the 
routing-security interdependency cycle. Simulation results 
show that the protocol is resistant to isolated attack 
launched by malicious nodes that may introduce spurious 
certificates in the networks. It also performs well against 
cooperative attacks when sufficient level of trust exists 
among some nodes before the network deployment.   
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